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By
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I
THE Tehran hostages case, with its legal implications, provides an important
occasion for probing into the effectiveness of the protection of the
privileges and immunities of diplomats, the most important channel of
communications between the members of the international community. It
has its specific political and social characteristics, which mark it as a sign of
our times and link it to another problem in the area of diplomacy, the Soviet
practice which may also be seen in the same perspective. Both are linked to
the political phenomenon affecting the world arena: the East-West
confrontation in the process of social and economic change and the
transformation of the international community.'
Any student of the legal order in action is familiar with the fact that its
practical enforcement is subject to local and regional deviations. Under the
general umbrella of the universal law of diplomacy, each capital treats its
diplomats with variations, depending on local conditions and traditions.
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations2 itself recognises this fact.
However, even at the first sight it is clear that Soviet practice is not of
merely local significance. The Soviet Union imposes the consequences of its
approach to the role of diplomacy on the international community at large,
thus influencing the regime of diplomacy in global proportions.
The objective of the present article is to test the formal source of the law
of diplomacy against the practice of States. As Charles de Visscher has put
it:
Every rule of positive international law ... presents two essential aspects for critical
examination on different planes: the degree in which its content corresponds to social
needs, and the accuracy of its formal expression compared with the practice of States.
The rule of international law retains its full force in application, and consequently its
positiveness, only insofar as it satisfies this double requirement. This is a fact of
experience particularly well illustrated in treaty regulation. A normative [law-making]
*Professor of Law, Duke University, North Carolina.
I. Certainly, the authority of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is affected by the
atmosphere of tension evident in various countries of Africa and Asia. Burning of embassies and of
diplomatic missions, murders of ambassadors and diplomatic agents. (Sudan, Afghanistan, Cyprus,
Lebanon, Egypt and Pakistan), though not directly due to official government action, is frequently the result
of revolutionary conditions induced by the regimes of the host countries. At the peak of Soviet-Chinese
tensions, reciprocal treatment of diplomats of the two countries left a good deal to be desired. While outside
the scope of the present inquiry, these events have a bearing on it.
2. 500 UNTS 95. Ratified on April 18, 1961.
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treaty the content of which is too far in advance of development in international
relations is stillborn, just as a treaty that ceases to be exactly observed in the practice of
governments is no longer valid in its formal expression.
Any study of the action of power on international law therefore demands knowledge
of all the social realities that determined this action as well as knowledge of the
processes of formal elaboration by which it takes effect.'
In the area of international law, upon which this article is focused, the
international community lives under the Vienna Convention. The
Convention is a codification of practice followed for centuries, and
provides for a minimum standard of conduct. Immunities and privileges
can be extended either unilaterally or bilaterally. Article 47 provides:
1. In the application of the provisions of the present Convention receiving State shall
not discriminate as between States.
2. However, discrimination shall not be regarded as taking place: (a) where the
receiving State applies any of the provisions of the present Convention restrictively
because of a restrictive application of the provision to its mission in the sending State;
(b) where by custom or agreement States extend to each other more favourable treatment
than is required by the provisions of the present Convention.
In case of discriminatory treatment of accredited diplomats in a given
capital, reciprocity is the only remedy open to the State, which considers
itself injured.
The institution of reciprocity in its limited form as it was defined in the
Convention is combined with a safety valve in the case of conflict between
the receiving and the sending States regarding the conduct of a diplomat.
The presence of the individual diplomat is always a question of consent;
should an accredited diplomat therefore overstep the boundaries of
diplomatic propriety, a simple declaration by the receiving State that he is
no longer acceptable (persona non grata, Article 9 of the Convention)
resolves the conflict. This procedure has the advantage that it avoids a
formalised conflict. Article 9 must be read in the context of two other
provisions of the Convention. Article 32 provides for the waiver of the
diplomatic immunity, and is directly related to Article 41, which lays down
in general terms the duty of the accredited diplomat to respect strictly the
legal order of the receiving country:
1. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons
enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the
receiving State. They have a duty not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State. ...
3. The premises of the mission must not be used in any manner incompatible with the
function of the mission as laid down in the present Convention or by other rules of
general international law or by any special agreement in force between the sending and
the receiving State.
Historically, the international law of diplomacy is the product of practice
in the fairly homogeneous international community of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, which shared its main opinions as to the role of the
3. Charles de Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law, pp. 137-8.
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State in the international legal order. This is not true today. The emergence
of a great number of States has strained the framework of the international
legal system and produced great diversity in the diplomatic practice of
States. It is important to realise that cultural diversity in the contemporary
international community must affect opinions as to what is the proper
application of legal rules. It is not surprising that though the rule of law is
uniform for the entire international community, it may produce different
results in individual cases. Law, as the eminent sociologist Gurvich stated,
consists of frameworks born of the needs and functions of what he calls real
collective units. Through these frameworks are introduced specific rules for
various environments in a social structure." Adapting Gurvich's theory to
the conditions that exist in the international community, uniform rules
result in different outcomes.
What both de Visscher and Gurvitch are concerned with is the
relationship between a formal legal rule and real power. Power in support
of the legal rule may come from the State or social groups interested in the
protection of its interests. Hence the frequent coexistence of legal
institutions, which assume different functions within various legal branches
corresponding to conflicting interests of different social groups (e.g.,
contract, property, and labour law). The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations is not "too far in advance of development of international
relations . . ." in the industrial West. At the same time, in a different social
environment, it may be a less adequate formulation of the regime of
diplomats. In a different set of international relations, the Convention may
be abused for purposes which have little in common with its spirit and
intended role.
II
The conviction that envoys of friendly or unfriendly powers require
protection was well founded in antiquity, and it became a part of the
civilised tradition of the Middle Ages, when the principle of the personal
inviolability of envoys became a principle of law. Until that time, the
protection of an envoy on a mission to a foreign country was assured by
religious commands. Transition from religious to legal guarantees occurred
gradually, although, for a time, writers and law-makers saw little difference
between the two. Already in the seventh century, Byzantium and its Slavic
neighbours observed strictly the principle of diplomatic inviolability as a
,rinciple of international law. Byzantine tradition was directly derived from
he principle of Roman law: "Si quis legatum hostium pulsasses, contra jus
4. Gurvich, Sociology of Law (1942) 198-203.
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gentium id commissum estimatus, quia sancti habentur legati." 5
In the West, the principle of the inviolability of envoys was sanctioned by
heavy penalties. Leges barbarorum (inspired by Roman law) provided for
the payment of heavy fines (blood money) for the killing of an envoy. 6 It is
important to realise, however, that in Middle Ages foreign missions and
embassies were frequently the business ecclesiastics, who were under the
special protection of the law wherever they went. 7 Kijevian treaties with
Byzantium of the early medieval period frequently included provisions on
the status and treatment of envoys. I
In contrast, the Arabs in the same period followed a different approach.
Protection of foreign envoys in Baghdad depended upon the assurances of
the Khaliff. Should he die, his assurances lapsed, and foreign envoys were
liable, as infidels, to be imprisoned, 9 though the Koran obligated Muslims
to assure proper treatment to foreign envoys. 19
In the course of time, provisions for the protection of foreign envoys
began to appear in legislative form. The decretum Gratiani of 1145 (a
systematic collection of papal legislation, discordantium canonum
concordia) stated that violators of the immunity of envoys were to be
excommunicated. 11 Las Siete Partidas issued by King Alphons X in twelfth
century Spain guaranteed to foreign envoys, not only personal inviolability,
but also immunity from suit in court. 1
In broad historical perspective, public opinion (including legal opinion),
international customary law, treaty law and internal legislation have
followed the same line of development, towards the universal protection of
the diplomats, including their immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts
(criminal and civil), and protection of the person.
The idea that a diplomat, representing a foreign sovereign is not subject
to local jurisdiction was formally stated in the case of the Spanish
ambassador, Bernardino de Mendoza (1584), who was a participant in a
conspiracy to depose Queen Elizabeth of England. The Privy Council
5. M. Taube, "Etudes sur le d~veloppement historique du droit internationale dans lEurope Orientale",
RCADI, 1926, 1, vol. 11, p. 376; "L'apport de Byzance au d6veloppement du droit international
occidental", RCADI, II, vol. 67, p. 264).
6. Redslob, R., L 'Histoire des grandes principes du droit des gens 145 (1923).
7. Behrens, "Treatises on the Ambassador written in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries" (1936) LI
English Historical Review, 204, 623.
8. D. B. Levin, Diplomaticheskii immunitet (1949) p. 30.
9. Antokoletz, Tratado teoretico y pratico de derecho diplomatico y consular (1948), vol. 1, p. 308. See
also E. Nys, "Les Commencements de la diplomatie et le droit d'ambassade juqu'a Grotius" (1884) XVI,
Revue de droit international et de droit compard, 169.
10. Redslob, op. cit. supra n. 6., p. 145.
11. E. Nys, Les origines du droit international (1894) p. 339.
12. Las Siete Partidas (trans. S. P. Scott, 1931) p. 144; M. Ogden, Juridical Bases of Diplomatic Immunity
(1936) p. 46.
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consulted Albericus Gentile as to whether Mendoza should be tried before
the English courts. Gentile's reply was that he should be expelled from
England to be punished by his sovereign. 1" But doubts persisted. Some time
later, in the case of another Spanish ambassador, Inojosa, who insulted the
Duke of Buckingham, Dr. Wellwood - a civilist - was of the opinion that
Inojosa was not protected by his diplomatic status, while Sir Richard
Cotton, who was also consulted, followed Gentile's advice. 4 New notions
took root with some difficulty. However, once they did, they were codified
in modern treaties on diplomatic relations: the general Act of the Congress
of Vienna (1815), modified three years later at the conference at Aix la
Chapelle (1818); the Havana Convention (1928); the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (1961), and, finally, the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected
Persons including Diplomats (1968).
The formalisation of the rules of international law was matched by ever
more elaborate provisions of municipal law providing for legal liability for
crimes against diplomats, and also providing for the strict delimitation of
the civil law situations in which members of the diplomatic corps could be
sued in the courts of the host country.
III
By the end of the Middle Ages, diplomatic missions had changed their
character, as they became permanent institutions. Their purpose was to
maintain continuous contact with the receiving country. By the end of the
seventeenth century, this practice, which had been started by the Italian
cities in their mutual relations, and was generally followed by the Holy See,
became quited widespread. Nearly all major European powers have since
converted to permanent diplomatic missions.
In Europe of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which was a period
of intensive dynastic rivalries, a permanent ambassador was frequently a
source of and encouragement to subversion and espionage, so much so that
espionage and intelligence gathering were deemed to be within the
traditional duties and occupations of diplomats. England (Henry VII) and
France (Francis I) of that time tried to control access to foreign envoys, in
order to restrict unauthorised contacts. In 1617, a law was passed in France
which prohibited the French from communicating with foreign envoys,
13. A. Gentile, De legationibus libri tres, vol. Ii, p. 80.
14. E. R. Adair, The Extraterritoriality of Ambassadors in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (1929)
p. 25.
15. A. H. Feller and M. 0. Hudson, Diplomatic and Consular Law and Regulations of Various Countries
(1933). Cf. also U.N. Legislative Series, Laws and Regulations regarding Diplomatic and Consular Privileges
and Immunities, (1958) S.T.L.E.G./Ser.B/7.
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except papal nuncios. In Venice, it was prohibited by law, under penalty of
death, to maintain relations with foreign envoys except by permission of the
Direttoria. 16 During the Cromwellian Revolution, no member of
Parliament or the government had the right to negotiate with foreign envoys
without special authorisation, under the penalty of losing his position. "'
Nevertheless, the opinion was widespread that espionage was one of the
most important functions of a foreign diplomat, 8 and Frederick II, king of
Prussia, considered the organisation of espionage services by accredited
foreign ministers a function authorised under international law. ,9
The fear of espionage caused the State of Muscovy in the sixteenth
century to adopt measures which practically sealed off foreign missions
from unofficial contact with Muscovite citizens. Envoys and their suites
were lodged in premises outside the city of Moscow, surrounded by high
stockades and guarded by troops. No person could enter or leave the
premises. In order to restrict diplomats' contacts with the outside world,
food and other necessities were supplied by the local authorities. Even
during travel through, the Tsar's dominions, foreign missions were under
constant supervision. Arrests of an entire mission, where something
suspicious occurred, were quite frequent. 20
The Russian obsession with diplomatic espionage (which survives in the
present day) is best illustrated by the case of Charles Taillerand, a
Frenchman in the service of the Transylvanian prince, Bethlen Gabor. In
1632, he arrived in Moscow and was immediately arrested and deported to
Siberia. The reason for this treatment of the unfortunate diplomat was his
denunciation by a member of his suite, who told the Orthodox Patriarch
Filaret that the ambassador's real mission was to spy for the Polish King.
He was finally released at the request of Luis XIII of France, who assured
the Tsar of his innocence. Professor Levin explains that at that time
diplomatic status did not guarantee personal inviolability, if the interests of
State security were involved. 2
IV
Espionage laws were not the only expression of the conviction that in the
case of conflict between State interests and the rights and privileges of
diplomats, vital State interests must be protected. History offers numerous
16. M. Redlich, The Law of Nations (2nd ed., 1937) pp. 18-19, 255.
17. Krauske, Die Ent-wicklung der standigen Diplomatie yor funfzehnten Jahrhundert bis zu den
Beschlussen von 1815 und 1818 (1883) p. 19.
18. Redlich, op. cit. supra n. 16, p. 19.
19. Krauske, op. cit. supra n. 17, p. 20.
20. Levin, op. cit. supra n. 8, pp. 90-1.
21. d. p. 94.
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examples of this outlook.
Three groups of cases are selected to illustrate the practice of States in
such situations. To the first group belong three incidents which took place
in the eighteenth century: the affair of Ghillemberg (1716), the arrest of
Prince Cellamare (1718), and the imprisonment of Monti, the French
ambassador to Poland (1735).
Count Ghillemberg, the Swedish minister to the Court of St. James, was
implicated in a vast diplomatic intrigue directed against English possessions
on the European continent and the person of King George I, including the
engineering of an insurrection in Scotland with the assistance of a Swedish
military force. The broader aspects of this diplomatic charade involved a
number of European powers. A letter which contained a report by Count
Ghillemberg was intercepted by the Danes, who informed London of the
conspiracy. Acting on this information the British government detained
Ghillemberg and seized his archives. The arrest of Ghillemberg caused a
mixed reaction in the diplomatic corps in London. The Marquis de
Montelon, the ambassador of Spain, lodged a formal protest with Lord
Stanhope, the British foreign secretary, finding it unfortunate that the
government had violated the personal inviolability of a foreign diplomat
and the archives of the Swedish mission. In reaction to the detention of
Ghillemberg, the Swedish government ordered the arrest of Jackson, the
British Minister resident in Stockholm. Eventually the affair was solved
through the good offices of France, and the exchange of Ghillemberg and
Jackson was duly arranged. 12
The case of Cellamare (1718), the Spanish ambassador in France, was
again an example of political intrigue, in this instance designed to disrupt
the system of European alliances directed against Spain, and to isolate the
protestant powers, England and Holland, by assuring the supremacy of the
Spanish faction headed by the Duc d'Orleans 'in France. Here again,
intercepted correspondence revealed the conspiracy against the government
of France. The Spanish Embassy was surrounded by troops and Cellamare
was arrested. Following the successful escape of the French ambassador in
Spain, Cellamare was deported to the Spanish frontier and set at liberty
there. 23
The last case in this series was the arrest of Monti, the French
Ambassador to the Polish Court. After the death of the Polish King, two
candidates for the Polish throne competed in the process of elections, and
one of them, Leszczynski, was supported by France, but opposed by
22. Martens, C. Causes celebres du droit des gens, vol. 1, pp. 97-147.
23. Ibid. pp. 149-177.
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Russia. Russia intervened militarily, and Monti was arrested by the
commander of the corps which besieged Danzig, where Monti had sought
refuge. The arrest of Monti was the subject of an extensive diplomatic
corresponden6e between the courts of France and Russia, the Russian side
advancing the view that since August 11, the King of Poland had died,
Monti's diplomatic status had lapsed. He was not accredited to the newly
elected king, and, by his intervention into the internal affairs of Poland, he
had violated the legal and political order of that country. In addition,
Russia contended that, although there was no declaration of war between
France and Russia, hostilities involving the armed forces of the two
countries had taken place, and Monti was a diplomatic representative of an
enemy, not entitled to privileges, immunities and courtesies in Russia.
Monti was released by the Russians only after 18 months in prison. 2"
It is worth noting that.in the case of Ghillemberg the conduct of the
British government caused some criticism, while the case of Cellamare was
passed over in silence, as his intrigues in France were generally recognised as
a serious departure from the code of diplomatic etiquette. In contrast,
Russian treatment of Monti caused a joint intervention by the ministers of
Holland and England in St. Petersburg on his behalf. 2
V
A series of incidents involving arrests of diplomats took place in the
stormy days which followed the October 1917 Revolution in Russia. The
new government dropped out of World War I, and sued for peace. There
were additional grounds for the unhappiness of the powers of the Entente.
Following the Revolution, the new regime initiated a systematic
revolutionary propaganda campaign addressed to the West, which was
combined with high-handed measures against individual western diplomats
who for one reason or another displeased the new regime. Although Russia
had quit fighting, the Romanians, who at that time occupied Besarabia,
continued fighting on the side of the Allies. In December 1917 the Soviet
government arrested the Romanian minister in Russia, Diamandi, and
released him on January 1, 1918, only after protests by the diplomatic
corps. 26
In the same period, the Soviet government adopted a practice of
appointing "Representatives of the People's Commisariat for Foreign
Affairs", without asking for formal accreditation. In England, the
"Representative" of the Bolshevik government was Maxim Litvinov who
24. Ibid. pp. 211-245.
25. Ibid. pp. 220
26. Ministerstvo Innostrannykh Diel: Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki, vol. 1, pp. 82 and 89.
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was appointed in November 1917. One of his first acts was to protest at the
drafting of Russian nationals into British Army service, in accordance with
an agreement with the Imperial regime. Litvinov contended, that since
Russia had concluded a peace treaty with the Central Powers, the agreement
was no longer in force. 7 In August 1918 the British government issued a
deportation order against Litvinov and his staff. In response, the Soviet
government promptly discovered an anti-Soviet plot organised by British
and French diplomats and arrested them. As Litvinov was detained, the
Soviet government proposed the exchange of Litvinov for the arrested
diplomats, insisting upon guarantees of inviolability of his person and
luggage by the governments of Britain, Holland, Norway and Sweden."
The next series of Soviet diplomatic events is directly connected with the
beginning and aftermath of World War II. Under the terms of the 1924
Consular Convention with Poland,2 a the Polish consul in Kiev enjoyed
diplomatic status. According to a report by the Polish ambassador to the
Soviet Union on September 30, 1939, a few days after the Soviet Union
invaded Poland, Mr. Matusinski, the acting consul in Kiev, was summoned
by the plenipotentiary of the Soviet Foreign Office in Kiev at 2 o'clock in
the morning, ostensibly to discuss the final details of his departure from the
Soviet Union. He went at once, with two chaffeurs, and vanished without
trace. The Italian ambassador Rossi, deputy dean of the diplomatic corps in
Moscow, intervened with Potemkin, Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign
Affairs, and received the reply that he had no information from the local
authorities. Potemkin pointed out that the Polish consul had already lost
his diplomatic status and could be arrested by the Soviet authorities if it
appeared that he had committed a crime against the Soviet Union.
Ambassador Rossi replied that he saw no possibility of that; although on
September 18, 1930 the Polish consul still enjoyed full diplomatic
immunity, he had on that date been interned. Rossi's intervention with
Molotov produced no results. He was told that the Soviet authorities had no
information concerning the Polish consul. 29
In the post-World War II era, several incidents involved the travel of
foreign diplomats in the Soviet Union. In October 1960, the British
Embassy protested against the detention and interrogation by the Odessa
police of two British diplomats who took photographs of a crowd in an
Odessa store. The Soviet government's explanation was that the
photographs were taken without the consent of the persons concerned and
27. Ibid. p. 103.
28. Ibid. p. 468.
28a. SDD. 2 pp. 38 et seq.
29. Documents on Soviet-Polish Relations 1939-1945 (1961) p. 89.
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that the British diplomats continued their activities in spite of that fact that
they were warned not to do so. 30
In September 1964, the American and British Embassies protested against
the arrest and detention of three diplomats who travelled from Moscow to
Vladivostok and the confiscation of notes and other materials on their
persons or in their possession. In reply, the Soviet note of October 6, 1964
alleged that the three diplomats had gathered information on "railway
junctions, bridges, tunnels, radar installations, airports, locations of troop
units, and other objects of defense significance," from the window of a
train on which they were travelling, using "special optical apparatus and
other technical intelligence devices"."
VI
The last group of incidents comes from the Middle East. One, of course,
is the case of American hostages in Iran; the other is the Iraqui-South
Yemen confrontation.
At the time when the American Embassy in Teheran was invaded by
Iranian militants, the Iraqui-South Yemen (Aden) confrontation had
ended. The event which precipitated this confrontation was the murder on
June 3, 1979, of Dr. Tawfiq Rushdi, an Iraqui refugee, who sought asylum
in Aden and became a professor at Aden University. According to a report
read over the Aden local radio on June 4, 1979, a group of Iraqui Embassy
security guards followed Rushdi in a car bearing diplomatic licence plates
ahd shot him near his home in the Mansurah district of Aden. Yemen's
reaction was to surround the Iraqui Embassy with troops. The Iraqui
ambassador was summoned to the foreign ministry, and presented with a
demand to surrender the suspects. 32
Upon the ambassador's refusal the next day, Yemenite troops stormed
the Embassy and arrested the suspects. In retaliation the Iraqui government
recalled the ambassador and arrested Yemen's charge d'affaires and the
entire diplomatic staff in Baghdad. 33 Intervention on behalf of the Yemen
diplomats was in vain. Charges were brought against three of the arrested
security guards. On September 17, the Supreme Court of South Yemen
found all three of the defendants guilty of Rushdi's murder. It declared
itself incompetent, however, as regards two defendants, because of their
diplomatic status and refused to impose a penalty. It sentenced the third
30. "Chronique des fail internalionaux" (1961) 65 Revue General du Droit International Public, 620.
31. Pravda. Izvestia, Oct. 7, 1964.
32. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, June 7, 1979.
33. Al Nahar (Beirut) June 10, 1979; see also Middle East, July, 1979, 10.
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defendant, who was not a diplomat, to ten years' imprisonment.34
Eventually, the incident ended with the release of the detainees. 3S
In the background of the Aden incident was a change of course in foreign
policy by Iraq. After a period of close alliance with the Soviet Union, Iraq
tried to put some distance between itself and its Soviet protector and to
improve its relations with the more conservative of its Arab neighbours.
The Baghdad regime sought to adopt a policy of greater openness towards
the West, seeking arms from France, as well as industrial equipment and
managerial skills. The new course, a typical example of the policy pattern
for small and weak countries in the Middle East, affected relations between
Iraq and the radical regimes of the Arab world, particularly Yemen, which
at that time had become an ally of the Soviet Union. As one commentator
stated:
Observers believe that Aden reacted so strongly to the [Rushdil assassination because
of Iraq's repression of the pro-Soviet Communist Party during the past year. A large
number of lraqui communists have sought refuge in Soviet backed Aden and others
went to Lebanon, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Aden obviously did not want a
spate of assassinations that could undermine not only its relations with the Soviet Union
and other Arab communist allies but also threaten its internal security. Moreover, the
Soviet Union has long wanted to criticise Iraq's anti-Communist purge but could not do
so directly and encouraged South Yemen to make an issue of Rushdi's assassination. "
A broadcast over the domestic radio service in Aden reported a statement
adopted by -
[the] mass organizations of the democratic Yemen ... that they regarded the heinous
crime, the victim of which was Dr. Tawfiq Rushdi, as a manifestation of the activities of
the lraqui Ba'th Party, aimed at torpedoing serious efforts to establish an activist Arab
front capable of thwarting the imperialist and reactionary schemes obstructing the Arab
nationalist liberation movement. The Iraqui Ba'th Party has performed a service for the
enemies of the Arab peoples struggling for liberation, democracy, social progress and
Arab unity."
The Aden regime claimed that its action was not directed against the
people and the government of Iraq, but at the Ba'th Party which betrayed
the Arab cause. Indeed, the action of the Aden government was aimed at
preserving good relations with Iraq, which is different from the Ba'th
Party. A government declaration stated:
These criminals wanted to harm and disrupt relations between our two countries and
to distract us from the major causes which unite us with Iraq in the joint struggle against
a common enemy. It is a secondary incident, when set against the pressing major cause
of confronting the Sadat-Zionist imperialist design aimed against our entire Arab
nation. "1
34. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Sept. 17, 1979.
35. Ibid., Sept. 24, 1979.
36. Al Nahar, June 10, 1979, 1; Middle East, July, 1979, 10.
37. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, June 7, 1979.
38. Ibid.
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The South Yemen government believed itself to be within its rights in
terms of international law. In a statement broadcast on June 7, 1979"9, it
stated:
We in Democratic Yemen hope that this incident will not prevent us from joint action
and from further unity and cohesion to confront the main dangers. Therefore, we again
ask the Government of Iraq to remove its forces from our embassy in Baghdad and to
lift the siege against the chargd d'affaires and embassy staff and give them full freedom
of movement and contact in accordance with international charters. We hold that this
behaviour towards our mission and embassy in Baghdad is unjustified, especially at the
time when the ambassador of Iraq and the staff of the embassy enjoy full freedom and
can conduct their normal activities as envoys of their country in Democratic Yemen.
Diplomatic immunity, the Aden government alleged, protected diplomats
not in violation of international law. The storming of the Iraqui embassy in
Aden was therefore legal, while the retaliatory action in Baghdad was
clearly illegal." ° That doctrine was modified somewhat by the Yemen
Supreme Court. In its opinion, the court asserted that Iraqui diplomats
were not immune from the jurisdiction of the Yemen courts. They could be
tried and declared guilty, but could not be sentenced. By implication, the
court accepted as legal the storming of the embassy and the detention of the
diplomatic personnel. '
The case of the American hostages in Iran brings the discussion of the
diplomatic regime to the present time.
At about 10.30 Teheran time, on November 4, 1979, a mob of
demonstrators attacked the American Embassy in Iran, and after a two-
hour seige obtained control of the building and seized the personnel present
in the Embassy offices. According to a statement by the U.S.
Government -
The Iranian government security personnel on duty at the Embassy compound made
no effort to deter or discourage the demonstrators from the takeover. Furthermore,
during the two hours of attack, no Iranian security forces were sent to relieve the
situation, despite repeated calls for help from the Embassy to the Iranian Foreign
Ministry, and despite the efforts of the United States charge d'affaires, who made
contact with the Prime Minister's office and Foreign Ministry officials at the time of the
attack. No attempt was made by the government of Iran to clear the embassy's
premises, to rescue the personnel held hostage ... nor did the government of Iran take
any action when, shortly after the Embassy seizure, the United States consulates in
Tabriz and Shiraz were also seized.
Since the time of the takeover, the Embassy personnel have been held hostage in the
compound under threatening and inhumane conditions. They were paraded in front of
the crowd of demonstrators, blindfolded, and bound. In the Embassy premises they
were kept bound, forced to remain silent, without communication with their
government and families.
It would be superfluous to give a full account of the atrocities committed by the
occupiers of the Embassy, threats to execute them, to put them on trial for espionage,
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., Sept. 17, 1979.
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restricting access to international observers ... The most important aspect was that the
militants holding the Embassy and the hostages issued demands to the United States
government threatening various reprisals against the hostages if these were not met.
... the Government of Iran, from an early stage of the crisis, has given direct support
and encouragement to the group holding the Embassy. Members of that group have
been permitted to come and go freely from the compound. The Government of Iran
refused or ignored the repeated requests of the Government of the United States to free
the hostages and restore the Embassy compound to the possession of the United States.
The Government of Iran has supported the demands of those holding the hostages, has
endorsed the charges of espionage levelled against Embassy personnel, and has
threatened to place the personnel on trial for espionage. 42
Simultaneously, the United States Government asked the Court of
International Justice to order that interim measures of protection to be
provided for the release of the hostages, for the premises of the United
States Embassy in Teheran to be cleared and for United States diplomatic
and consular staff to be assured full freedom in the Embassy and Chancery
premises and freedom of movement in Iran necessary to carry out their
diplomatic and consular functions. It also asked that the Government of
Iran should not place any person attached to the United States Embassy or
Consulate in Iran on trial and that it should refrain from any action to
implement such a trial, and finally that the Government of Iran should
ensure that no action was taken which might prejudice the rights of the
United States in respect of the carrying out of any ruling which the Court
might render on the merits, and in particular that the government of Iran
shall neither take nor permit action that would threaten the lives, safety or
well being of the hostages. " In due course, the Court assumed jurisdiction
and issued an order providing for interim measures in accordance with the
American request.
While these legal steps were being taken, the United States Government
pursued negotiations through various channels, including the good offices
of friendly governments, and through the Secretary-General of the United
Nations. As a result of a gentlemen's agreement between the Secretary-
General and the Iranian Government, it was stipulated that the crimes
committed by the ousted regime in Iran against the Iranian people should be
investigated by an international commission of inquiry, and that the Iranian
government should, upon the convening of the Commission, release the
hostages into the custody of a third party, and enable the Commission
meanwhile to see all the hostages. On March 9, 1980, the Commission, after
spending two weeks in Teheran, returned with its mission unaccomplished,
while the condition of the hostages and the occupation of the Embassy
remained unchanged.
42. International Legal Materials (1979), XVIII, 1466-69.
43. Ibid. 1482-87.
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At the moment of writing, it is useless to expand the account of the case
of the hostages beyond these simple facts. The International Court of
Justice both in its interim order and final judgment left in no doubt that the
Iranian action was in violation of the Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
VII
Soviet diplomatic practice represents another aspect of a State distorting the
letter and the spirit of the Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
At the background of the Soviet regime of diplomacy stands the
conception of the historic role of the Soviet State as a centre of world
revolution. In the realisation of this historic mission, foreign service is a
cover for intelligence and espionage activities. Diplomatic immunities serve
in the first place to ensure the immunity of Soviet diplomats exposed as
spies. The only risk a Soviet diplomat faces is the danger of being declared
persona non grata, under Article 9 of the Convention. The abuse of the
Convention for this purpose is compounded by the practice of retaliating
when Soviet diplomats are expelled by expelling the diplomats of the other
side. This is, of course, an embarrassment for a country which has resorted
to the Article 9 procedure.
The list of countries from which Soviet diplomats have been expelled
under a charge of espionage is quite extensive. During the 1970's Soviet
diplomats were expelled from Australia and New Zealand. In Europe,
Soviet diplomats were declared personae non grata in Belgium, Denmark,
France, Great Britain, Holland, Norway, Spain, Switzerland and West
Germany. In Asia, Soviet diplomatic spies were expelled from China and
Japan. In Africa, Soviet diplomats were asked to leave their posts in
Equatorial Africa, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Tunis and Zaire (Congo
Kinshassa). In some of the major European industrial countries espionage
scandals occurred with considerable regularity. In the United States
diplomatic scandals of this sort involved also members of the United
Nations staff and of the Soviet embassy to the United Nations. Soviet
diplomats were also exposed as spies in Colombia and Mexico.
Some of the Soviet activities were clearly an attack on the security and
tranquility of the host countries. In Equatorial Africa, Soviet diplomats
were implicated in organising a general strike. In the Ivory Coast, Soviet
diplomats were accused of stirring up a revolt among army personnel and
university students. In Colombia, Soviet diplomats were said to have
organised guerilla activities.
Some of the activities of Soviet diplomats verged on the bizarre. In
Switzerland, a Soviet diplomat was apprehended buying counterfeit identity
documents. In France, in 1973, a Soviet air attach was caught stealing
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aerial equipment (cameras) shown at the Le Bourget air show. In Britain, a
Soviet diplomat was detained in a state of inebriation, after a drinking
session with a British air force sergeant whom he had tried to recruit for
espionage service. Another Soviet diplomat was caught shoplifting in a
London department store. In Norway, a young university student was
promised an exit visa for his Muscovite sweetheart in return for joining the
Soviet espionage service. He was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment,
while the Soviet diplomat involved was expelled.
The Soviet government follows the policy of overstaffing its missions
abroad. That these supernumeraries have no duties of a diplomatic
character was demonstrated in the case of an espionage scandal in Britain in
1971, as a result of which the British government expelled 105 members of
various missions in London in connection with the defection of an
important Soviet spy in France. In 1972, the Bolivian government expelled
49 Soviet diplomats. The Soviet mission in that country numbered 62
diplomats, while the Bolivian mission in Moscow was staffed only by three
diplomatic agents.
One may surmise that only a small proportion of Soviet espionage
activities by diplomats is uncovered. Furthermore, in a number of
countries, for example, West Germany, the authoritiesprefer a quiet rather
than publicised liquidation of those involved in espionage incidents. Should
an espionage scandal become public almost automatically the Soviet
government retaliates by expelling an identical number of the other
countrys diplomats. In the 1970's not a single foreign diplomat was expelled
from Moscow, except as a retaliation. The only contrary instance was the
case of the Venezuelan ambassador in Moscow who befriended dissident
artists and writers and was declared persona non grata.
Some Soviet espionage agents are well known, and are not, of course,
considered desirable in diplomatic posts abroad. In 1976, France refused
admission to two Soviet diplomatic spies who had earlier been expelled
from Britain. In retaliation the Soviet government refused visas to three
French diplomats.44
44. Data on the Soviet diplomatic espionage was garnered from the "'Chronique des fais internalionaux"
regularly appearing in the Revue Generale de Droil International Public. Incidents referred to in this article
took place in the period 1969-78: R.G.D.I.P. (1970) 74: Lebanon, 741-2; Switzerland, 755-56; Italy, 493;
Kenya, 183; Ivory Coast, 143; (1971) 75: Argentina, 741-42; Great Britain, 1162; United States, 191-92;
Zaire, 1175; Holland, 545; (1972) 76: Great Britain, 1174-1179; Japan, 1186; Mexico, 569; Italy, 568; Great
Britain, 536; West Germany, 139; Equatorial Africa, 843; (1973) 77: Colombia, 800; Bolivia, 489; Denmark,
507; (1974) 78: France, 676; Tunis, 1193; France, 1160; Norway, 852; France, 262; West Germany, 487;
(1975) 79: China, 185; New Zealand, 846; (1976) 80: Holland, 622; West Germany, 1193; Denmark, 1209;
(1977) 81: Australia, 497; Spain, 1136; Switzerland, 580; Holland, 311; Great Britain, 299; France, 539;
(1979) 83: Spain, 160; United States, 167; France, 172; Venezuela, 201.
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VIII
The first conclusion which comes to mind in the light of such
confrontation of the Convention with the practice of States is that
reciprocity in the regime of diplomacy plays a much larger role than is
accorded to it in formal law. The inability to answer in kind exposes the
diplomats of countries with stricter standards of conduct in international
relations to dangers and humiliations. The treatment of western diplomats
in Moscow, in the Matusinski case, and in Tehran, in the Iran hostages case,
seems to confirm that conclusion. That the Aden case was finally resolved
by concerted action was probably due to the determination of the Iraqi
government to ensure the safety of its diplomats by the reciprocal use of
violence.
It is also clear that the Convention is not a complete code of law, in the
sense that it contains no answer to situations in which the interests of
international relations come into conflict with vital national interests of a
great power. Certainly, the Soviet Union uses the Convention to serve its
interests on a world-wide scale in matters of security, access to raw
materials, and the search for prestige and influence. Soviet diplomatic
practice also demonstrates a basic attitude to the use of force as a legitimate
and legal instrument of policy, which in the mind of Soviet leaders is
justified not only by the condition of the international community, but also
by the condition of contemporary international law. While the Soviet Union-
and its lawyers and diplomats participate in the process of developing codes
regulating the behaviour of States in international relations, the Soviet
government conducts itself in a manner which pays little attention to legal
restraints in the use of force. Soviet practice as regards the law of the sea is a
case in point." 
Early in the nineteenth century, Charles de Martens, who was a member
of a distinguished family which provided a number of European countries
with diplomats, and who was a professor of international law, published a
two-volume collection of materials illustrating the diplomatic practice of
States. " In the preface he acknowledged that, at the time of the supremacy
of the Holy Alliance, one of the principles of contemporary international
law was the right of armed intervention, which by that time had already
been applied twice, against Piedmont and against the Kingdom of Naples.
The basis of that right was the Treaty of Paris of November 20, 1815, which
settled the shape of Europe after twenty years of Napoleonic Wars. Martens
defines the real regime of diplomacy in the contempor ary international
45. Grzybowski, Soviet Public International Law (1970) pp. 188 et seq.; R.D.G.I.P. (1976) 80, 308; lbid.'
(1974) 78, 517.
46. Martens, C., Causes cdlebres du droit des gens (1827).
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community at that time. The criterion of legitimacy is a shared conviction in
different social environments that the use of force is legitimate in certain
circumstances. The same criterion may be applied generally to the world
public order as it influences the realities of international relations. The law
of diplomacy, and international law in general, is by no means a universal
code, although universally adopted agreements certainly suggest the
opposite. Instead, one may profitably use the notion of the coexistence of
rules and norms formulated at various times which have retained their force
to this day. Seen in this perspective, one may wonder whether Iraq's
reaction to the storming of its embassy in Aden was contrary to
international law. It was certainly an act permissible under the international
law of the first decades of the eighteenth century. One may further ask
whether diplomatic espionage, as practised by the Soviet Union, although
clearly illegal in terms of the present regime of diplomacy, is not a legitimate
practice according to the law of diplomacy of Frederic, King of Prussia. By
the same token, the Brezhnev doctrine of limited national sovereignty of the
countries of the socialist system, and the right of intervention in their
internal affairs, is highly reminiscent of international law as it was practiced
under the Holy Alliance. However, the comforting thought is that under
any concept of international law, the killing of diplomats or taking them as
hostages has always been illegal.
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